Structural Injustice, Shared Obligations, and Global Civil Society by Belic, Jelena & Bozac, Zlata




Structural Injustice, Shared Obligations, and Global Civil Society 
 
Jelena Belić and Zlata Božac  
 
Forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice  
 
Abstract: It is frequently argued that to address structural injustice, individuals should participate 
in collective actions organized by civil society organizations (CSOs), but the role and the 
normative status of CSOs are rarely discussed. In this paper, we argue that CSOs semi-perfect our 
shared obligation to address structural injustice by defining shared goals as well as taking actions 
to further them. This assigns a special moral status to CSOs, which in turn gives rise to our duty 
to support them. Thus, we do not have full discretion when deciding whether to join collective 
actions or not. Under certain conditions, we can even be forced by others to do our share.  
 









On December 29th, 2018, the government of Thailand finally ratified the ILO’s Work in Fishing 
Convention (No. 188), which defines minimum labor standards for improving the safety, health, 
and medical care of workers in the fishing industry. The ratification came about after years of 
campaigning and pressuring the government by advocacy groups including the International Labor 
Rights Forum, Human Rights Watch, Anti-Slavery International, and many local organizations.1 
All these organizations had been trying not only to influence Thailand’s government but also to 
draw the world’s attention to forced labor and human trafficking in the fishing industry in Thailand, 
whose products are sold by the major US and European retailers.2 
This example highlights at least three morally important issues. First, it instantiates what 
Iris Marion Young terms structural injustice. According to Young, structural injustice “exists 
when social processes put large groups of persons under systematic threat of domination or 
deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time that these 
processes enable others to dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and 
exercising capacities available to them” (Young 2011:52). Second, by showing how consumerist 
habits of the affluent are maintained by products that are often manufactured in terrible working 
conditions, it unfolds how individuals are connected to structural injustice: injustice results from 
an aggregate of numerous individual and institutional actions, many of which are not wrong in 
themselves. Finally, it also illustrates the important and pervasive role civil society organizations 
play in transforming the existing unjust structure. In this paper, we take the existence of structural 
injustice as our starting point and seek to clarify what the shared obligation to alleviate the injustice 
implies for individuals.  
 
1 For more information see https://laborrights.org/c188. 
2 In 2014 the Guardian conducted a thorough investigation of the slavery problem, see Hodal, Kelly and Lawrence 
2014.  




Recently, philosophers have argued that individuals in unstructured collectives, such as the 
“affluent” or the “consumers”, can hold shared obligations to alleviate structural injustice.3 While 
those involved in the debate disagree about the nature of individual responsibility for structural 
injustice, they share the view that individuals bear a shared prospective obligation to address the 
injustice.4 When it comes to compliance with the shared obligation, one prominent proposal is to 
participate in the global civil society. Civil society organizations are often seen as forces of social 
progress since they tend to pursue morally valuable goals, such as the improvement of working 
conditions or saving the environment.5 Once we take a closer look, however, the existing accounts 
of shared obligations face difficulties. Namely, individuals are encouraged to support CSOs 
because of the capacity of the latter to coordinate collective actions, but it is left up to them to 
decide how or when to do so. If there is such individual discretion, however, it is hard to see how 
collective actions can take place, since individuals might decide to postpone their actions or 
disagree about which cause to support. In other words, the normative arguments in favor of leaving 
discretion to individuals are in tension with the ontological assumptions concerning the capacity 
for collective action — the more discretion individuals have to act, the less capacity for collective 
action there will be.  
In this paper, we develop an account of shared obligation to alleviate structural injustice 
which is able to avoid these difficulties. By combining the ontological claims made in social 
 
3 We use the terms “obligation”, “duty”, and “responsibility” interchangeably to indicate moral reasons to act or to 
refrain from acting. 
4 Pogge (2008) argues that the citizens of affluent countries are culpable for causing structural injustice, while Young 
claims that sustaining structural injustice does not entail individual culpability, since, in her view, individuals neither 
intend to cause the harm, nor do their individual actions make a difference to its occurrence (2011:103). We choose 
to remain agnostic about the nature of an individual responsibility for structural injustice and we focus on prospective 
obligations to address the injustice. We understand prospective obligations as forward-looking obligations to take 
actions in the future.  
5 For instance, global civil society has contributed to a new global consensus on human rights and an emerging 
consensus on climate change (Kaldor 2012). Some of these achievements have been officially recognized, such as 
Amnesty International winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977. 




ontology literature with the normative claims of structural injustice literature, we develop an 
account that is both ontologically plausible and normatively defensible. We accept the ontological 
claim that individuals in unstructured collectives can hold shared obligations if they have the 
capacity for collective action, but we add that such a capacity can be secured by existing group 
agents, such as CSOs. The normative part of our argument maintains that CSOs play an important 
moral role since they semi-perfect our shared obligation by defining worthy moral goals and by 
organizing collective actions to further them. The semi-perfect nature of our shared obligation to 
alleviate structural injustice entails that we have less discretion in deciding which collective actions 
to support, and sometimes we can even be socially forced to do so.  
The argument runs as follows. We start by situating our approach within the ongoing debate 
about the existence of shared obligations. While we agree that the shared obligation to alleviate 
structural injustice necessitates the capacity for collective actions, we point out that the existing 
collectives, such as CSOs, can secure such actions even on a global scale. We proceed by 
reconstructing the role CSOs play with regard to our obligations. According to our view, they 
specify worthy moral goals and also take actions to further these goals. Given such a normative 
status, individuals do not have full discretion in deciding whether or not to join these collective 
actions. We consider the ways in which individuals should reason about participating in collective 
actions, and we also argue that, if certain conditions obtain, the individuals can be forced to do 
their share in mitigating the injustices.  
 
Understanding shared obligations  




Large-scale global problems pose a moral conundrum since it is unclear who can bear the 
obligations to address them. On the one hand, there seem to be no appropriate group agents that 
could bear these obligations. On the other hand, individuals by themselves, given their limited 
capacities, cannot bear individual obligations in this respect either. Recently, philosophers 
expanded the subject of the investigation by arguing that individuals in unstructured collectives 
can bear shared obligations as they have the collective capacity to make a difference in solving 
large-scale problems. While the idea of shared obligations seems attractive because of its potential 
to close a responsibility gap regarding large-scale problems, it is less clear what considerations 
ground such obligations.6 
There are two possible ways to define these considerations, which we will call the lax and 
the restricted view. According to the lax view, in order to bear shared obligations, individuals in 
unstructured collectives need to have a collective capacity; not necessarily to form a shared goal 
or act together, but something much less demanding. For instance, Gunnar Björnsson argues that 
an unstructured group can satisfy standards of caring about a particular outcome by virtue of its 
individual members caring about it. To care appropriately about something means to “be disposed 
to notice factors relevant to how well it goes with the object in that regard and to invest resources 
(cognition, action, material and social means) to promote it in light of these factors.”7 While 
sometimes bringing the outcomes members of unstructured collective care about requires 
coordination with others and formation of a shared goal, this is not always the case, and at least 
 
6 There is an additional way to construe individuals’ obligations regarding large scale problems as individual 
obligations to create collectives capable of dealing with the problems (Collins 2013). Since we are concerned with the 
normative status of existing collectives (i.e. CSOs), we leave the duty to collectivize aside.  
7 Obligations as ensured by caring (OEC) are, according to Björnsson (2021, ft 8), “structurally similar” to virtue 
ethics in the sense that the rightness of actions is closely connected to personal qualities of those performing it. 
However, as opposed to virtue ethics, OEC are about obligations, and the appeal to appropriate caring is less 
demanding than agential virtue. 




some global issues, such as climate change, might be tackled without taking this step. For instance, 
Joan can take certain actions to tackle climate change, such as flying less in order to reduce her 
carbon footprint, irrespective of what others do. Individuals can take shared obligations of groups 
of which they are members as reasons for their own actions (Björnsson 2021; Wringe 2010). This 
is significant, since, according to the lax view, the unwillingness of others to do their share does 
not cancel the shared obligations. Proponents of this view claim that this is how activists think 
about their own actions. 
The lax reading stipulates weak conditions for the existence of shared obligations, which 
implies that we bear more obligations than we tend to think. However, it is unclear whether such 
a weak view of shared obligations can be applied to cases of structural injustice. While it is 
plausible to call upon individuals to focus more on morally valuable outcomes than on what others 
are doing, the lax view can place too much emphasis on individual actions. It seems to suggest that 
individuals can sufficiently do their shares to tackle large scale problems by simply changing their 
behavior and individual lifestyles. While such changes are not only desirable but might even be 
necessary, it is hard to see in what sense they amount to activism, since, arguably, the purpose of 
activism is to affect the actions of others in order to bring about greater, structural changes. 
This takes us to what we call the restricted view, according to which individual members 
of unstructured groups can bear shared obligations only if they have the ability to act collectively. 
To act collectively, individuals have to be able to form a shared goal and believe that others will 
contribute their share toward that goal (Schwenkenbecher 2013; Lawford-Smith 2012). This view 
is restricted in two senses. First, it makes the existence of a shared obligation conditional upon a 
sufficient number of members contributing to a shared goal. If an individual comes to reasonably 
believe that others are not doing their part, her contributory duty ceases to exist. Second, the 




restricted view limits shared obligations only to those unstructured collectives where members can 
communicate in order to form a shared goal and correct beliefs about the contributions of others.8 
Such communication, on this view, is practically possible only in small to medium-sized 
collectives, such as passers-by.   
By taking the capacity to act collectively as a necessary condition for the existence of 
shared obligations, the restricted view avoids some of the pitfalls of the lax view with regard to 
alleviating structural injustice. It correctly captures the fact that individuals are tempted not to 
sacrifice their self-interest unless assured that others will do so as well. It also plausibly suggests 
that before we form a belief about the unwillingness of others to do their share, we should try to 
affect their willingness to act. However, it seems that the restricted view does not satisfactorily 
resolve the problem of shared goals formation. It suggests that the formation of shared goals at a 
global level is practically impossible, but it overlooks the possibility that direct communication 
and deliberation may yield deficient shared goals. That is to say, to get many agents to agree about 
a shared goal, such goals often need to be indeterminate and vague.9 It follows that communicating 
and deliberating about potential shared goals need not necessarily be a satisfactory way to form 
such goals. Therefore, when it comes to the formation of shared goals concerning large-scale 
problems, individuals in unstructured collectives can adopt goals promoted by CSOs. We will 
come back to this. Furthermore, through their activities existing organizations can assure others 
that at least some individuals take actions toward the realization of shared goals.10If we ignore 
 
8 Schwenkenbecher (2019) recently refined her view by weakening conditions for collective obligations. Instead of 
communicating with others in unstructured collectives, agents are required to employ ‘we-reasoning’, which is the 
type of moral reasoning “where agents in considering their options for acting take ‘collectively available’ options into 
account and act on that basis”. 
9 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing our attention to this.  
10 Note that the restricted view can accommodate this empirical objection. Indeed, Schwenkenbecher explicitly says 
that if many individuals are part of a global initiative (e.g. for carbon emission reduction), if their actions contribute 




these contributions, then we seem to have incorrect beliefs about the actions of others. Hence, the 
activities of CSOs increase the capacities for collective actions of individuals in unstructured 
collectives. To the extent that there are CSOs that play such a role globally, we can assign shared 
obligations even to large unstructured collectives.11 We examine this in more detail later.  
The role of CSOs is well captured in Young’s discussion on structural injustice. In her 
words, “[b]eing responsible in relation to structural injustice means that one has an obligation to 
join with others who share that responsibility in order to transform structural processes to make 
their outcomes less unjust” (Young 2011: 103). ”Joining with others” implies collective action, 
and collective action requires a form of coordination that civil society organizations and social 
movements can facilitate (Young 2011:69, 122). Young’s insights about the role of CSOs can help 
us refine the restricted view concerning the necessary conditions for the existence of shared 
obligations to alleviate structural injustice. We agree with the ontological claim of the restricted 
view that the capacity for collective action is necessary to hold shared obligations, but we aim to 
show that existing group agents, most notably CSOs, enable collective actions by providing shared 
goals and by acting upon them in a morally desirable and relevant way.12 
Before we embark upon this investigation, it is important to resolve a prior theoretical 
problem. It is typical to think of shared obligations to alleviate structural injustice as binding, but 
 
to their shared goal, and if they are based upon the belief that others also contribute, then this can count as collective 
action (2013:315). 
11 Similarly, Wringe (2018) argues that individuals have a pro tanto duty to act in accordance with existing 
organizations to meet given collective obligations, since changing the organizations is complicated, time-consuming 
and unpredictable.  
12 It is noteworthy, however, that the existence of CSOs and their relation to unstructured collectives raise an 
interesting question usually disregarded by social ontology literature. This literature tends to focus on analyzing 
different types of collectives taken in isolation, while it is also important to understand the way they interact. For 
instance, how should we understand the relation between fair trade organizations, as group agents, and consumers, as 
members of an unstructured collective? There is a sense in which group agents make it possible for everyone to take 
action. 




discretionary in the sense that individuals can decide how and when to participate in collective 
actions (Young 2011:168). Leaving discretion to agents is intended to avoid the charge of 
overdemandingness since it permits individuals to decide what is reasonable for them to do given 
their abilities and personal circumstances (Young 2011:143). However, if individuals have full 
discretion regarding how and when to participate, it is very unlikely that necessary collective 
actions will take place. Hence, the idea that shared obligations leave discretion to individuals in 
deciding about acting collectively seems to be in tension with the premise about the need for 
collective actions to tackle structural injustice. We explain this in the next section.  
 
Discretion and collective actions  
In the previous section, we argued that the views which allow agents full discretion to decide how 
and when to comply with their shared obligation to alleviate structural injustice are seriously 
deficient. So construed, the shared obligation appears to have indeterminate content and mirrors 
what is often called imperfect duty.13To clarify the problems discretion creates for shared 
obligations, it is instructive to take a brief detour and explain what imperfect duties are.  
While there is no agreement about the definition of imperfect duties14, it is broadly accepted 
that these duties are about vague moral goals that individuals should pursue in a way they deem 
appropriate.15Imperfect duties are usually contrasted with so-called perfect duties, which have 
 
13 Note that Young follows Feinberg’s conceptual distinction between duties and responsibilities. The former prescribe 
concrete actions, whereas the latter leave agents with the discretion to decide which actions to take (Young 2011:143). 
We agree that there is a distinction between moral obligations that prescribe actions and those that leave decisions 
about actions to agents, but we think that the distinction better maps onto the distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties, rather than the one between duties and responsibilities.  
14 Rainbolt (2000) lists eight possible ways to define imperfect duties and finds all of them wanting.  
15 This understanding dates back to Kant’s view in Kant 1999.  




specified content, as they correlate with rights and require concrete actions with regard to particular 
persons. The main motivation to distinguish between perfect and imperfect duties is to be able to 
identify which duties can be enforced by public institutions.  
The distinction between perfect and imperfect duties as individuals’ duties has attracted 
plenty of criticism, but we will not enter this debate here (Buchanan 1987; Gilabert 2016). Instead, 
we will focus on a specific problem that is relevant to the discussion of shared obligations. Namely, 
the indeterminacy of content of imperfect duties generates problems for complying with them. In 
the absence of clear action-guidance, individuals are faced with uncertainty in deciding on various 
occasions whether they should comply or not (Goodin 2016). Moreover, the indeterminacy of the 
duty’s content generates what Buchanan helpfully identifies as “a powerful temptation to moral 
laxity” (1996: 31).16Moral laxity is a distinctive kind of moral failure which occurs when agents 
fail to do enough to advance a worthy moral goal over a significant period of time. Importantly, 
moral laxity can stem from a lack of knowledge about what one ought to do in a particular situation 
and not only from slacking or a lack of proper motivation. Even well-motivated individuals might 
be unable to figure out what they ought to do in a particular situation. In order to decrease the 
epistemic burden as well as to fight off the natural propensity for moral laxity, we should seek to 
determine the content of moral obligations, i.e. to perfect them, rather than to assume that 
individuals will be trying to strengthen their moral fiber by using vague moral standards. 
If indeterminate content creates these kinds of problems for complying with imperfect 
individual duties, it will create even greater problems for shared obligations. If individuals indeed 
have significant discretion in deciding how and when to participate in civil society, how will they 
 
16 In Buchanan’s words, “[i]f we are overly selective in picking our battles, we may never fight at all” (1996: 31). 




come up with shared goals and act accordingly? Notice that the problem cuts all the way down to 
the very concept of shared obligations. That is to say, discretion impedes the collective capacity to 
form shared ends since individuals can disagree about which goals to pursue collectively and when 
to do so. If shared obligations depend upon the capacity to form shared goals, and if individual 
discretion undercuts this capacity, then there can be no shared obligations at all. To use the 
terminology of imperfect duties, shared obligations, by definition, cannot have fully indeterminate 
content; they cannot be imperfect duties proper. Therefore, any account of shared obligations to 
alleviate structural injustice that leaves individuals significant discretion is implausible. The 
insistence on discretion presupposes a weak account of the role of civil society organizations as a 
mere efficient means to achieve certain desirable ends.17 In the remainder of the paper, we attempt 
to show that the role of CSOs is far more important, since they semi-perfect our shared obligation 
to alleviate structural injustice. This entails that our discretion in participating in collective actions 
led by CSOs is limited more than we tend to think.  
 
The moral role of civil society 
As mentioned before, when it comes to perfecting the content of our moral obligations, 
philosophers tend to focus on public institutions which, in their view, authoritatively define the 
content of norms and enforce compliance with them. By doing so, institutions resolve (or at least 
attempt to resolve) various problems that arise among individuals, including collective action 
problems. Because of this perfecting role, they have special moral status, which gives rise to an 
 
17 It also presupposes a liberal voluntarist view of civil society organizations as resulting from individuals exercising 
their freedom of association. For an insightful discussion about the liberal view of associations and their connection 
to principles of justice see Cordelli 2012. 




individual’s duty to support as well as to comply with them.18 While we agree that moral 
obligations need to be specified in order to be complied with, we also think that exclusively 
focusing on the role of public institutions is insufficient. If anything, the world is plagued by 
various injustices that public institutions, national and international alike, are either unwilling or 
incapable of resolving (O’Neill 2001). This suggests that we ought to evaluate the role that other 
types of organizations play in this regard too. With respect to many global issues, such as 
environmental protection or the improvement of labor standards, CSOs are often the first actors 
that come to mind, since their impact, regardless of being perceived positively or negatively, is 
undoubtedly pervasive. 
There are many ways to define civil society. According to Rainer Forst, civil society is “a 
collective of free citizens who organize their common life in an autonomous and co-operative way” 
(Forst 2017:451). It might seem difficult to generalize this definition on a global level, since the 
concept is tightly connected to that of citizenship, and, some might think, too Western to capture 
different organizational forms worldwide (Forst 2017). We acknowledge that global civil society 
is a “fuzzy and contested concept” (Kaldor 2012), but for our purposes, we use a descriptive 
definition that seems rather uncontroversial. Following civil society scholars, global civil society 
is “the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located 
between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national 
societies, polities, and economies” (Kaldor et al. 2001:17). The distinctive feature of global civil 
society is its global dimension— the organizations attempt to address global issues, involve cross-
border communities, and seek supranational solidarity (Scholte 1999). So defined, global civil 
 
18 This is a Kantian argument about public institutions, which was further developed by Rawls (1971). For further 
elaborations see, for instance, Waldron 1993; Miklosi 2008. 




society brings together (I)NGOs, social movements, labor unions, consumer protection bodies, 
peace activists, world forums, indigenous groups, professional associations, charities, faith-based 
organizations, foundations, etc.19For our purposes, we will set aside these organizational 
differences and treat global civil society as a whole.  
How can we characterize the role of CSOs regarding our moral obligations? Some might 
think that CSOs are one of the most efficient means to achieve certain morally desirable ends.20 
While practical considerations are certainly important, empirical research about the efficiency of 
these organizations is inconclusive, as it is often difficult to measure their impact (Werher and 
Ahmed 2008). That being said, we leave the question of efficiency aside and explore whether 
CSOs are more than a mere means to morally desirable ends. Earlier we suggested that CSOs can 
help us define a more plausible account of the shared obligations to alleviate structural injustice. 
Recall the two necessary conditions for the existence of shared obligations: that individuals in 
unstructured collectives must be able to form a shared goal, and that they must have reasonable 
beliefs about others contributing toward the same goal. We proceed to explain how CSOs satisfy 
both conditions and accordingly, semi-perfect our shared obligations.21 
 
Defining shared goals  
Examining the role of CSOs can help us give more substance to the concept of ‘shared goals’. 
While there are significant differences among the existing CSOs, they all pursue non-commercial 
 
19 The definition excludes so-called service-providing NGOs, since it is contested whether or not they can be 
considered as part of civil society at all. By closely cooperating with and often being financed by state institutions, it 
is questionable to what extent these organizations are autonomous. For an illuminating discussion, see Cordelli 2016. 
20 For instance, Singer (2009) argues that the best way for affluent individuals to help those in dire need is to donate 
to effective charities. The idea inspired the effective altruism movement, see https://www.effectivealtruism.org/. 
21 This is compatible with CSOs bearing obligations of their own as group agents, but we do not consider this here.  




objectives, such as, for instance, respect for human dignity and rights (Werher and Ahmed 2008). 
Such missions usually do not stay at the rhetorical level only, but CSOs also strive to place them 
on the public agenda. Recall the example from the beginning of the paper: it is likely that the Thai 
government would never, or at least not in the foreseeable future, ratify the ILO convention and 
start working toward improving the working conditions in the fishing industry without having been 
pressured by CSOs. In the absence of functioning global institutions that are able to define and 
further public interests properly, CSOs make certain global issues salient and, arguably, could be 
said to define and, at least to some extent, represent public interests globally.  
In addition, CSOs shape and reshape many informal rules that influence not only public 
institutions but also how we relate to one another. In this sense, they affect the beliefs and attitudes 
of people, often attempting to change problematic norms. In the light of global structural injustice, 
they also contribute to the emergence of an ethos of global solidarity. For instance, in the mid-
1990s, activists of the anti-sweatshop movement raised consumers’ awareness of the working 
conditions in which most clothes are still being produced (Young 2011). Without constant 
exposure to the evidence CSOs have been providing, consumers in affluent countries would 
probably not have been able to obtain such information, let alone take it under moral consideration. 
Finally, many of our moral obligations require advancing certain moral goals, but these 
goals tend to be vague and general, such as not to harm others or to help those in need. Missions 
of CSOs specify these goals at a more practical level, thus making them more manageable and 
concrete. Think about Earth Hour, an annual event during which everyone on Earth is encouraged 




to simultaneously turn off electric lights for an hour. While the ultimate goal of the event is to 
tackle climate change, it is narrowed down to a well-defined goal that can easily be achieved.22 
In sum, by pursuing specific missions and values, CSOs enable us to unite around shared 
goals. It follows that we need not insist that individuals in unstructured collectives need to 
deliberate shared goals; at least sometimes, it suffices to support the goals that are already 
promoted by the CSOs. To be sure, these goals are diverse and not all of them pertain to structural 
injustice, but some of them do significantly. We will come back to this.  
 
Providing assurance  
Earlier we argued that what makes public institutions morally relevant is not only that they specify 
moral obligations, but also provide the assurance that people will comply with them by coercing 
them to do so. One might say that CSOs also provide a kind of morally relevant assurance, albeit 
qualitatively very different from the institutional one.  
Aside from specifying important moral goals, CSOs also identify and pursue a particular 
course of action in order to further these goals. For instance, they issue reports about human rights 
violations, provide concrete policy recommendations, and exert pressure on decision-makers both 
at the national and the international level to bring about certain reforms that can go as far as 
establishing new international institutions.23 Such actions can be taken as contributions of CSOs 
toward shared goals, which in turn can assure us that CSOs are doing their part and, accordingly, 
give us moral reasons to act as well. Although admittedly, CSOs cannot provide the kind of 
 
22www.earthhour.org; the next Earth Hour will take place on March 27th, 2021.  
23 The most famous example is the enormous contribution of the Coalition for the ICC to the creation of the 
International Criminal Court in 1999.  




assurance that coercive institutions can, they can effectively and reliably “signal” compliance with 
moral norms to others, thus increasing the likelihood and intensity of their participation.24 We can 
think of the contributions of CSOs not as assurance in a strict sense, but more as a non-coercive 
ushering: they can motivate others to act by acting themselves.25 To be sure, to motivate others, 
CSOs also need to communicate to others their successes and reasons to join.26Thus, they need to 
be more transparent about their actions and also open channels for participation to non-members. 
We will come back to this in the last section.  
At this point, one might wonder why require individuals to take part in collective actions, 
since the actions take place all the same? There is a normative and practical reason for this 
requirement. Morally speaking, as CSOs supply us with shared goals, our continuous indifference 
to pursuing these goals might be understood as a form of free riding. If agents in unstructured 
collectives hold the shared obligation to alleviate structural injustice, then one can say that 
individuals who ignore the extent to which CSOs strive to remedy injustice through collective 
efforts are in effect freeriding on them. Practically speaking, to be able to do their job more 
effectively, CSOs need support not only in the form of donations but also in terms of giving 
legitimacy to their actions as well as increasing pressure on decision-makers. While many CSOs 
have morally worthy goals, they often lack the ability to achieve these goals on their own (Kirk 
2012). Hence, to grow into bigger movements and have a greater impact, CSOs need our support.27 
 
24 According to Lawford-Smith (2015), it is important that signaling is ‘reliable’ in the sense that it is the sign of 
genuine commitment, since only such commitment can motivate actions of others. 
25 This is confirmed by the studies on the so-called peer effect, which makes individuals more likely to donate to 
charity if they see that their peers are doing the same (The Behavioural Insights Team, 2013). Furthermore, many 
fundraising causes often display a “progress bar” showing how close they are to the goal, because people are more 
willing to give the closer the goal is to be achieved. 
26 We owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.  
27According to the Extinction Rebellion, an organization focusing on the climate and ecological emergency, the 
evidence shows that they need the involvement of 3.5 % of the population to succeed, which in the UK amounts to 
the support by 2 million people. See https://rebellion.earth/ 




In sum, by defining important moral goals and acting toward their fulfillment, CSOs 
identify what needs to be done and do their share, too. In this sense, they semi-perfect our shared 
obligation to alleviate structural injustice, and, therefore, have special moral status. If the special 
moral status of public institutions entails a duty to support them, then something similar can be 
said about CSOs— they also have a special moral status, albeit different from the institutional one, 
which entails our duty to support them. However, since the perfecting role of CSOs falls short of 
one of the institutions, our duty to support these organizations is not as stringent as our duty to 
support public institutions. Nonetheless, it is a duty rather than a matter of good will. Defined this 
way, it may appear that our account of the shared obligation to alleviate structural injustice does 
not really resolve the problem we have set to resolve —if CSOs pursue different goals and we can 
support different CSOs, then the collective action problems might persist. We give a weaker and 
more robust answer to this.   
 
“Justice for all just ain't specific enough” 
As the lyrics of John Legend and Common's song “Glory”, dedicated to civil activism, suggest, 
the fact that one is promoting justice will not necessarily result in justice being done. Is our 
dedication to shared goals alone sufficient to guide our actions? On the one hand, there are many 
global problems and interests attached to them, and on the other hand, there is a multitude of 
organizations with distinct and overlapping causes that an individual could potentially support. 
Given these circumstances, how can we decide which action to take? 
The present discussion suggests that individual discretion with regard to shared obligations 
is not as unlimited as it is usually thought. To explain this, it may be helpful to refer to what Young 




defines as parameters of reasoning —principles for making decisions about our actions in relation 
to structural injustice (Young 2011). According to Young, individuals should reflect on their place 
within the unjust structure along dimensions of power, privilege, interest and collective ability and 
choose their actions accordingly. For our present purposes, the parameter of collective ability is 
the most relevant one: individuals should strive to act with others to transform the structures by 
supporting the existing civil society organizations. However, the parameter is somewhat vague 
and open to different interpretations. 
One way of interpreting the parameter concerning collective ability is to see it as an 
instruction for individuals to cultivate certain dispositions or virtues, such as becoming more 
sensitive to injustice or more willing to act collectively (McKeown 2016). However, it remains 
unclear in what sense such an inward-looking view, which we dub the virtue-based approach, is 
supposed to enable collective action since coordination problems can arise even among well-
motivated individuals who are willing to cooperate. There seems to be a bigger problem with the 
virtue-based approach: namely, it ignores certain features of our psychological make-up. While 
the approach aims to moderate individual moral demands, in fact, it falls short of it, since it 
intensifies a different kind of obstacle. By leaving obligations discretionary, it actually creates an 
epistemic burden, as we need to figure out what to do, and thus decreases the likelihood of us 
doing it. Research shows that the way in which tasks are presented to us enormously influences 
the probability that we will accomplish them.28 Since the virtue-based approach leaves the content 
of shared obligations indeterminate, it is likely that compliance will be decreased and lead to the 
occurrence of moral laxity—if we are unsure about what we ought to do, it is probable that we will 
 
28The 2013 report of the Behavioral Insights Team (BIT) of the UK's Cabinet Office tested the usage of various 
behavioral techniques in prompting people to give to charitable causes, showing that the likelihood that people will 
conform to the norm depends quite dramatically on the way a problem or a question is presented to the test subjects.  




not do anything (Buchanan 1996). The virtue-based approach, hence, simultaneously appears to 
be overly epistemically demanding and insufficiently morally demanding. For this reason, we need 
another, more robust interpretation of the parameter about collective ability, which we call the 
action-based view.  
The action-based view strives to develop an action-guiding exegesis of the collective 
ability parameter, which is based on a more limited conception of discretion. For this purpose, it 
is helpful to distinguish between three dimensions of discretion: executive, object-oriented and 
temporal. They relate to three decisions that an individual has to make when deciding how to 
support civil society: which actions to take, whom to support, and finally when to support. While 
the actual extent of individual discretion varies across these dimensions, depending upon one’s 
personal circumstances, we believe that discretion can be reasonably limited along all of them. 
Let us start with the dimension where individuals have the most discretion – the executive 
one. The decision about which actions to undertake depends particularly on one’s personal 
circumstances and resources. Yet, there are still certain considerations that individuals should keep 
in mind when deciding about the form of their support to CSOs. First of all, we are likely more 
resourceful than we think. The privilege of being citizens of affluent countries not only gives us 
more opportunities to reflect on our personal choices and habits but also provides us with a chance 
to act within civil society with relative ease. Possible actions include a broad range of activities, 
from donating, becoming a member of an organization, participating in organized events, etc.  
When it comes to choosing the object(s) of support, discretion is more limited. While 
CSOs, with their multiple and diverse goals, reflect global value pluralism, the shared obligation 
to alleviate structural injustice does not entail support for all of them. Even though the question of 
reasonable value pluralism is still unsettled, we believe that CSOs should meet certain desiderata 




so that we have moral reasons to support their actions. While we cannot provide a full account of 
desiderata here, we believe that they would include at least the following. To begin with, CSOs 
should pursue legitimate goals—those goals that are compatible with the principle of moral 
equality. Besides being egalitarian, their goals should also be responsive to public reasons, i.e. 
they need to be justifiable by appeal to some publicly shared considerations.29This would, for 
example, exclude goals that appeal to unsubstantiated scientific claims. Given that structural 
injustice involves various unjust aspects of the existing global structure, CSOs should ultimately 
aim at reforming this structure.30Further, the activities and structure of CSOs should be organized 
in a participatory manner, including those who are supposed to benefit from their 
activities.31Finally, we should favor those CSOs that aim at building alliances and coalitions at a 
local or global level, as coordinating with a large number of people increases the likelihood that 
successful large-scale collective action will take place.32 
 
29 The debate about defining public reason is too complex to be discussed here. For a seminal work, see Rawls 1993. 
We need not commit to any particular account of public reason, since most of them tend to agree that common 
scientific truths fall under public reason.  
30 It may appear that these desiderata will exclude a great deal of human rights organizations, since they tend to 
focus on the violation of civil liberties and the promotion of rights to subsistence which may leave the existing 
structure intact. For an argument along these lines, see Moyn 2018. We do not dispute such a characterization of 
human rights organizations, but we point out that a great deal of argumentative work is done by the concept of 
structural injustice. Structural injustice, according to Young (2011), is not predominantly about distributive justice, 
but it is about unpacking various ways in which the structure affects and constrains individual actions. This suggests 
that structural justice may be compatible with both sufficientarian and egalitarian distributive demands, as the equal 
moral status might demand either. Therefore, as long as CSOs advocate structural reforms (as well as meet other 
desiderata) we have moral reasons to support them, irrespective of what specific rights they promote. It is also 
noteworthy that it is not straightforward that grievances resulting from structural injustice ought to be defined in 
terms of violation of rights, but examining this point is beyond the scope of the paper. We are grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point.  
31 Scholte and Timms (2009) argue that what is crucial for the success of an organization is not so much the scale of 
its organization, but how it is organized. Going global does not necessarily make organizations more elitist or 
exclusive, as long as they offer participation and control to the victims of the structural injustice that they are trying 
to address.   
32 The upshot of this desideratum is that individuals are required to join the ongoing collective efforts, rather than 
that collective actions start taking place only once individuals have already joined. We are grateful to an anonymous 
reviewer for pressing us to clarify this.  




As we can see, the desiderata limit the range of CSOs to be supported, but this still leaves 
room for individual convictions, since it is up to individuals to decide which particular CSO from 
this range to support. We ought to support organizations that fall within the subset of those that 
meet the desiderata, but we can choose within the subset based on our convictions. For instance, 
if a faith-based organization and a secular one both meet the desiderata, individuals can decide 
which one to support based on their convictions. If there is only one such organization, however, 
individuals are required to support it as long as it meets the desiderata, even if it goes against 
personal convictions. For instance, non-believers should support a faith-based organization that 
aims to alleviate structural injustice if that is the only one accessible to them. Non-believers have 
moral reasons to do so as long as the organization meets the above-mentioned desiderata.  
The temporal dimension leaves the least discretion to individuals, as the urgency of global 
issues does not leave much room for any delay in action. For instance, a report released in October 
of 2018 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emphasizes the urgency of 
structural changes necessary to mitigate the dramatic effects of climate change (IPCC 2018). 
Furthermore, in cases of gross human rights violations, immediate action is of paramount 
importance for those who suffer. Thus, individuals are morally required to start participating in 
those organized collective efforts that address urgent matters. While we do have discretion 
regarding which action to take, we have no discretion in choosing whether to act or not, as the 
refusal to act can impede collective action. Given the urgency of certain issues, we also think that 
all else equal, individuals can be socially forced to do their share. We turn to this now.  
 
When is social enforceability permissible?  




Earlier we mentioned that the coercive enforceability by public institutions is often seen as the 
main dividing line between perfect and imperfect duties – public institutions can coerce those 
subjected to them to comply with perfect duties (those with determinate content), but not with 
imperfect ones. The institutions secure compliance with perfect duties by issuing commands 
backed by the threat of sanctions. Public enforceability, however, is not the only way in which 
compliance with moral obligations can be secured. Earlier we suggested that CSOs can secure 
compliance with the shared obligation to alleviate structural injustice by what we called ‘non-
coercive ushering’: motivating others to act by acting towards the fulfillment of moral goals 
themselves. As its name suggests, this way of calling others for action is non-coercive as it attempts 
to increase participation in collective actions by leading by example. That said, it is not 
straightforward that this is all CSOs are permitted to do in order to secure that desirable collective 
actions take place.  
As we know from our daily lives, we can be forced in some sense to do certain things by 
individuals or groups, too. For instance, we force one another when we object to someone cutting 
a queue, when we tell people that they should recycle, or when we express public criticism for 
actions that we deem undesirable. Some go as far as to claim that social enforceability can be as 
effective (and even as oppressive) as legal or public enforceability (O’Neill 1990:224). In our 
view, this is exaggerated, since social enforcement does not limit freedom to the extent public 
enforcement does. If anything, we can always ignore social criticism or resist social pressure, no 
matter how uncomfortable that can be. It remains an open question whether it is permissible to 
force individuals to do certain things, even in this weak sense of “force”.33 
 
33For a detailed discussion about the necessary conditions for coercion see Nozick 1972.  




When it comes to CSOs and social enforceability, we can think about it in two ways. The 
first way is relatively uncontroversial. It seems broadly accepted that CSOs can put pressure on 
national and international institutions to take certain actions and call them to accountability via 
means such as ‘naming and shaming’, protesting, interrupting the institutional events, etc. Based 
on what we have argued so far, the permissibility of such enforcement is justified by the moral 
status of CSOs, which is based on identifying valuable moral goals and taking actions to achieve 
them. Thus, it is relatively uncontroversial that CSOs can exercise some form of pressure on those 
that have greater power than them to take responsibility and act. 
What about individuals? Earlier we argued that CSOs often define valuable moral goals 
and initiate actions to further them and that individuals have moral reasons to join their initiatives. 
In the previous section, we argued that this view entails that individuals do not have such wide 
discretion with regard to collective actions as it is usually thought. We suggested ways in which 
the individual discretion is limited when deciding which actions to take, and we also argued that 
the temporal dimension of discretion is the most restricted—we ought to join collective actions 
that address urgent matters. Consider the following example. Recently, the Extinction Rebellion 
blocked the roads around Heathrow airport in order to prevent the expansion of the airport. The 
protest aimed at making the UK government fulfill its promise to decrease carbon emissions by 
2025 (Somerville 2019). Also, think about individuals preventing planes from taking off until they 
release potential asylum seekers that their governments planned to send back to their countries of 
origin (Crouch 2018). Such actions deal with urgent matters like slowing down climate change or 
preventing the extradition of asylum seekers to their home countries, where their lives would be 
in danger.  




While actions like these are aimed at holding public institutions accountable, they also put 
pressure on individuals. When the protesters block roads or prevent planes from taking off, they 
impose costs on the citizens relying on them. Assuming that the CSOs meet the desiderata we 
defined earlier and also attempt to address urgent matters, we can think of this as an instance of 
permissible social enforceability — CSOs forcing people to bear costs of duties they independently 
hold (in these cases, to tackle climate change or to help those in need).  
Note that CSOs are not the only ones being permitted to force compliance, but individuals 
sharing the obligation can do so, too. This social enforceability is justifiable because the 
individuals sharing obligation are accountable to one another for taking or not taking actions. After 
all, people willing to comply cannot take effective collective actions if a significant number of 
others refuse to join. Therefore, on our account of shared obligations, individuals are permitted to 
force one another to comply, if all conditions are satisfied. The notion of force includes actions 
such as calling for participation, imposing social pressure, criticizing non-compliance and 
sometimes, imposing unwanted costs, such as being late in the office due to road blockage or 
missing a flight.  
If we indeed share the obligation to alleviate structural injustice, and if CSOs organize 
actions for this, then they can force us to do our share. Unlike perfect duties enforceable by 
coercive public institutions through legal means, the aforementioned semi-perfect duties 
instantiated by CSOs are socially enforceable —they are enforceable by individuals and groups.  
This view will very likely attract numerous objections. First, one might worry that there 
are simply too many collective actions taking place; if CSOs start forcing people to join each of 
these, then this will simply impose too high costs on individuals. Given the number of CSOs as 
well as the actions they take worldwide, this is a well-founded worry. The demandingness, 




however, can be mitigated by several factors. To begin with, we have identified the set of 
desiderata that CSOs have to meet if they are to be permitted to force our compliance and make us 
bear certain costs, and not all the existing CSOs meet them. In addition, there is a division of labor 
among these organizations —they operate in different parts of the world. Therefore, their actions 
impose costs on the individuals that find themselves in close proximity, such as the Londoners or 
the passengers on the plane in Sweden from the abovementioned examples.34In other words, it is 
rarely the case that the same group of people is bearing multiple costs of different collective 
actions.  
Another worry may be that the permissibility of social enforceability opens the door to 
“vigilante justice”—some groups could attempt to arbitrarily impose their subjective conception 
of justice on others. This raises the complex problem of the disagreement about what justice 
demands, which we cannot fully tackle here. It suffices to say that our argument applies only to 
those CSOs that meet the desiderata, and therefore, are sufficiently democratic and participatory. 
Thus, they provide the forum to debate what justice demands regarding particular issues. 
Furthermore, the global civil society is usually not focused on imposing a specific conception of 
justice, but it advocates structural and incremental changes in areas that are widely recognized as 
problematic mostly through raising public awareness and pressuring responsible institutions.35 In 
this sense, CSOs are not those judging what justice demands, but they force public institutions to 
determine it.  
 
34 This raises the complex question of the fair distribution of burden among individuals, since it may happen that some 
people simply bear more costs than others by sheer bad luck. The problem of fair distribution of burden is too complex 
to be addressed here.  
35 Think for instance of the World Social Forum, which provides a platform for debating various instances of injustice 
rather than promoting full-fledged proposals. The closest to a substantive proposal it comes is the call for people 
worldwide to solidarity and support for one another’s diverse struggles.  




Finally, one may worry that it is simply unfair to focus on individuals since so little depends 
on them and structural injustice is mostly about “big players”, such as corporations or unjust 
institutions. Asking individuals to bear costs to alleviate structural injustice is also problematic 
since it is unclear whether they can avoid actions that contribute to structural injustice at all. The 
objection questions the concept of structural injustice. As such, it cannot be applied to our view, 
as we have assumed that individuals are implicated in structural injustice by virtue of the 
accumulation of their individual actions, which can inadvertently lead to various injustices. Our 
argument holds only to the extent that individuals bear at least some responsibility for structural 
injustice. By focusing on individuals we do not imply that “big players” are off the hook; on the 
contrary, all we aim for is to ensure that there is enough collective force to pressure big players in 
order to change the existing unjust conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed an account of shared obligation to alleviate structural injustice as a 
semi-perfect duty, the content of which is partly determined by civil society organizations. 
Through their missions and actions, these organizations provide shared goals and usher us toward 
their realization. Thereby, they assume a special moral status which entails our duty to support 
them. While these considerations seem intuitive, the importance of civil society is continuously 
ignored. Liberals tend to focus either on institutions or on relations among individuals, while often 
neglecting what is in between —an autonomous and self-governed sphere of multiple associations. 
We tried to make a few steps towards remedying this gap by establishing how civil society can 
coordinate collective actions toward morally desirable goals. While not everyone is required to 
become an activist who dedicates the entire life to transforming structural injustices, one ought not 




to limit one’s own contribution to changing consumer habits either. Instead, one should be more 
responsive to the ongoing collective efforts to alleviate structural injustices and under certain 
conditions, even be forced to do one’s own share. 
 
Jelena Belić 
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